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Executive Summary
New York is city of renters, with 2.1 million rental apartments. 
The majority of those apartments — 1.4 million — are regulated 
under the laws of Rent Stabilization and Rent Control.  
 One of the key benefits of rent regulation for our city is that it 
keeps rent levels predictable, an important benefit for working- 
and middle-class neighborhoods.
There is a major loophole in the system called the “1/40th pro-
gram”. This loophole allows a landlord to raise the rent on an 
unoccupied apartment by passing the cost of physical improve-
ments to the next tenant by raising the monthly rent an amount 
equal to 1/40th of the total cost of the improvements. 
There is no oversight of any kind of the 1/40th program. Land-
lords are allowed to unilaterally impose 1/40th rent increases 
without prior approval, or even documentation. As a conse-
quence of this lack of oversight, fraudulent abuse of the 1/40th 
program is increasingly common. This includes, for example, 
claiming a rent increase based on $40,000 when only $10,000 
was actually spent on improvements. 
The lack of oversight of the 1/40th program has led to wide-
spread fraud, and a significant loss of affordable housing.  
The state housing agency must accept a more active oversight 
role of the 1/40th program by using its current authority to audit 
increases and inform tenants residing in apartments where the 
landlord has filed a 1/40th increase. 
Additionally, tenants and housing advocates are calling for legis-
lative changes that would extend the amortization formula from 
40 months to 84 months and give the state housing agency a 
stronger oversight role by authorizing it to approve rent increas-
es. These changes are necessary to discourage fraud, ensure 
that the law is upheld, and preserve affordable housing.  
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IT HAS become clear that lack of over-sight of the 1/40th        program by the state 
housing agency has led 
to widespread fraud, 
and a significant loss of      
affordable housing.
Background: 
New York is city of renters, with 2.1 million rental apartments. 
The majority of those apartments – 1.4 million - are regulated 
under the laws of Rent Stabilization and Rent Control. Rent 
regulation is designed to give tenants some stability in a real 
estate market so tight that, without rent regulation, the interests 
of tenants and landlords would not be balanced. One of the key 
benefits of rent regulation for our city is that it keeps rent levels 
predictable, an important benefit for working- and middle-class 
neighborhoods.  Each year, the Mayor’s appointees to the Rent 
Guidelines Board set the amount that a rent stabilized rent can 
be increased when a lease is renewed, and an additional in-
crease when the apartment becomes vacant. These increases 
averaged 6.7% and 20% respectively over the past five years. 
While these Rent Guidelines Board rent increases are not small, 
there is a major loophole in the system – called the “1/40th pro-
gram” - that allows almost unlimited rent increases in vacant 
apartments.  In recent years, it has become clear that lack of 
oversight of the 1/40th program by the state housing agency 
has led to widespread fraud, and a significant loss of affordable 
housing.  
Abuse of the 1/40th program is increasingly common, especially 
among many of the “predatory equity” developers who have be-
come notorious for their illegal behavior. Another factor in the 
rise in abuse of the 1/40th program is the tremendous incentive 
to raise rents, legally or otherwise, created by High Rent Vacan-
cy Decontrol, which allows landlords to permanently de-regulate 
a vacant apartment if the rent can be raised to $2,000. 
Tenants and housing advocates are calling for legislative change 
to tighten the 1/40th program, and calling on the state housing 
agency to strengthen its oversight of the 1/40th program to dis-
courage fraud, ensure that the law is upheld, and preserve af-
fordable housing. 
ABUSE of the 1/40th program  is increasingly 
common, especially 
among many of the
 “predatory equity” 
developers who have 
become notorious for 
their illegal behavior. 
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The 1/40th Rent Increase Program
The 1/40th loophole, also known as an Individual Apartment Im-
provement Increase, allows a landlord to raise the rent on an 
unoccupied Rent Stabilized apartment by making physical im-
provements to the apartment. The owner is able to pass the cost 
of that improvement to the next tenant by raising the monthly 
rent an amount equal to 1/40th of the total cost of the improve-
ments. For example, if a new tenant moves into an apartment 
where the legal rent should have been set at $1,000 a month un-
der current guidelines, but the landlord spent $20,000 on physi-
cal improvements to the apartment while it was vacant, then the 
monthly rent can be set at $1,500. (1/40th of $20,000 is $500). 
This formula allows for dramatic rent increases, and far exceeds 
rents increases based on building-wide improvements (the Ma-
jor Capital Improvement Program), which are based on a 1/84th 
formula.
Physical improvements eligible under the rules can include, 
for example, new bathroom fixtures, new kitchen appliances, 
and new flooring. Costs associated with maintenance, such 
as plumbing, sanding floors and painting are not considered 
to be “improvements” and cannot be counted towards a 1/40th 
increase. The 1/40th program is intended to reward genuine 
improvements; basic maintenance such as painting or plaster 
patching cannot be counted as improvements. A 1/40th rent in-
crease can be taken in addition to any other rent increase to 
which the landlord is statutorily entitled. 
A 1/40th increase is unilaterally imposed by the landlord. A land-
lord does not have to seek permission or provide any proof of 
expenses to the state agency that oversees rent regulation, the 
Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR), in order 
to apply the 1/40th rent increase. The increase can simply be 
added onto the apartment rent when a new tenant first moves 
in. Because it is open-ended and can be applied on a flexible, 
apartment-by-apartment basis, the 1/40th program is probably 
the single most important mechanism that developers and land-
lords use to increase rental income from a building. This is es-
pecially clear in predatory equity buildings, where many devel-
opers have filed their underwriting terms with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. (See below). 
There is an enormous incentive for landlords to use the 1/40th 
program because, while most increases under rent stabilization 
allow only a moderate rise in the rent, a 1/40th increase can al-
low huge increases, limited only by how much a landlord can 
invest to improve a given apartment.  With its central importance 
to a developer’s profit model and open-ended design, the 1/40th 
should be well-regulated to prevent fraud and abuse. The op-
posite is true.
WITH its    central   importance 
to a developer’s 
profit model and 
open ended design, 
the 1/40th should 
be well-regulated to 
prevent fraud and 
abuse. The opposite 
is true.
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How the 1/40th System Invites Fraud
The 1/40th system is vulnerable to fraud because there is no 
oversight or certification of any kind. Landlords are allowed to 
unilaterally impose 1/40th rent increases without prior approval, 
or even documentation. 
The oversight mechanism intended in the design of the1/40th 
program is tenant-initiated complaint. If, for example, a tenant 
knows that a landlord has based the rent on improvement done 
to the apartment when it was vacant, but suspects that the value 
of the work may not actually justify the amount of the increase, 
the tenant has the right to file a Complaint of Rent Overcharge 
with the DHCR. If the complaint is accepted for processing by 
the DHCR, then the DHCR will then ask the landlord to provide 
evidence of the cost of the improvements in the form of bills, in-
voice, cancelled checks, and other proof of payments.  
This tenant-driven enforcement mechanism is inadequate. Be-
cause the improvement occurs in a vacant apartment, the new 
tenant has no reason to know what the rent should, or should 
not be. 
While a landlord is legally required to provide an apartment 
rent history as an addendum to a first lease on a rent stabi-
lized apartment, this rent history addendum is rarely provided. 
Where it is provided, the addendum is most often ignored by 
the new tenant, who is naturally focused on the current rent 
that he or she must pay, not the rent paid by the previous ten-
ant. Even when a tenant knows that a landlord has used a 
1/40th increase to justify the apartment rent, that tenant is not 
in a position to know what the prior condition of the apartment 
was, what improvement were actually made, or what the cost 
of those improvements realistically should have been. 
The tenant-complaint-driven system of oversight is further weak-
ened because many landlords use 1/40th increases to move the 
apartment rent above the $2,000 High Rent Vacancy Decontrol 
threshold that allows them to permanently de-regulate the apart-
ment. Thus, if a tenant in a deregulated apartment files a chal-
lenge because he or she believes that the 1/40th increase may 
be based on fraud, that tenant is especially vulnerable to retalia-
tory eviction by the landlord.  For this reason, even a tenant who 
has reason to suspect fraud may be unwilling to file a complaint. 
THIS tenant-driven  enforcement mechanism is           
  inadequate.
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Cases Studies of 1/40th Fraud: 
Some recent examples paint a clear picture of the abuse of the 1/40th pro-
gram, and why a tenant-complaint driven enforcement system is unrealistic 
and ineffective. 
• Case study 1: A tenant moved into a one-bedroom apartment in Wood-
side, Queens, and signed a lease for a monthly rent of $1,996.07.  A form 
called an Apartment Rent History Rider was attached to the lease that the 
tenant signed. However, the tenant was not an expert in the laws governing 
how rents are set in rent stabilized apartments in New York City. She had no 
reason to be suspicious of, or even understand, the information in the Rider. 
Some time later, the tenant noticed a pattern of problematic behavior by the 
landlord, and went back to read the Rider in detail. The Rider stated that 
the previous tenant had paid a rent of $730, and that the landlord claimed 
to have invested $42,100 in improvements when the apartment was vacant 
as the basis for a 1/40th increase that raised the monthly rent to $1,900. 
Suspicious that the landlord did not spend $42,100 in her small and shabby 
apartment, the tenant went to Home Depot and tried to price all the im-
provements, including parts and labor, that the landlord could have possibly 
made. According to the tenant’s generous estimate, the landlord could not 
have spent more then $20,000. The tenant called the landlord’s manage-
ment company to clarify what improvements were made, and the tenant re-
ports that she was told by the building manager that the landlord assessed 
a 1/40th charge on every vacant apartment based on the same amount 
- $42,000 – even though this amount was not actually spent. According to 
the tenant, the managing agent claimed that this is how the system worked, 
even though this is contradicted by the law. The tenant filed an overcharge 
complaint with the DHCR in August 2008, and is awaiting a response. 
• Case study 2:  A tenant moved into a non-rent-regulated apartment in 
2002, paying a rent of $2,000. The $2,000 amount is significant because 
the apartment had previously been rent regulated, but was removed from 
regulations when the rent climbed to the threshold for “high-rent vacancy 
de-control”, which allows a landlord to permanently remove a vacant apart-
ment from rent regulation when the rent is legally raised to $2,000 or above. 
Soon after signing the lease, the tenant learned that the apartment had 
previously been rent regulated, and that the prior tenant paid $402.  Taking 
into account normal rent increases to which the landlord would have been 
entitled, the landlord would have had to have spent over $60,000 to improve 
the apartment in order to justify the rent increase. The matter came before a 
State Supreme Court judge, where the landlord claimed to have done major 
improvements to the apartment, including electrical, plumbing, and other 
improvements. At the trial, the landlord was unable to prove the majority 
of the expenses he claimed. An architect called as a witness by the tenant 
testified that the most any work done by the landlord could have reasonably 
cost was less the half of the $60,000 the landlord was claiming. The court 
found that the landlord had made fraudulent use of the 1/40th system to will-
fully overcharge the tenant. 
• Case study 3: A tenant moved into an apartment in the Bronx in 2003, 
with the lease recording a rent of $967. The tenant became concerned that 
her rent was not set at the legal amount when she leaned that the previous 
tenant had paid $497 a month, and that normal rent increases to which the 
landlord is entitled should only have raised the new rent to $597.  The land-
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lord claimed that he had spent $15,000 in improvement to the 
apartment when it was vacant, and that this justified the higher 
rent. Because the apartment did not appear to have been reno-
vated or improved in any meaningful way, the tenant and land-
lord ended up in housing court. The landlord claimed to have 
installed new floors, doors, sinks, cabinets, faucets and tile. 
However, there was no physical evidence of improvement, and 
the landlord had no proof of any kind of the expenses for which 
he was charging. After a trial, the court ruled that the landlord 
had failed to establish any work in the apartment beyond routine 
maintenance, and that this fraud constituted a willful overcharge 
of the tenant. 
• Case study 4: A tenant moved into an apartment in Sun-
nyside, Queens and signed a lease to pay a monthly rent of 
($1,700?). As in the first case study, the tenant had been given an 
Apartment Rent History Rider along with the lease, but paid little 
attention to the Rider because he was not expert enough in the 
law to understand what it said. Some time later, he looked over 
the Rider and became suspicious for two reasons: 1) His apart-
ment was quite modest , yet on the rider the landlord claimed to 
have spent $34,000 in improvements in order to justify a 1/40th 
increase that raised the rent from the $718 that the prior tenant 
paid to the current rent of $1,700. 2) The itemized cost of actual 
renovations rarely come to round numbers, like $34,000, sug-
gesting that the claimed cost of the improvement was not based 
on actual expenses.
• Case study 5: A tenant moved into an apartment in Forrest 
Hills, Queens 2004, signing a lease for $2,000 a month. This 
$2,000 number is significant because that amount is the thresh-
old that allows a landlord to remove a vacant apartment from the 
Rent Stabilization system of rent regulation. A few years later, 
the tenant learned that the prior tenant in the apartment has paid 
a monthly rent of $800.34. Calculating the legal rent increases 
that the landlord would have entitled to in 2004 (vacancy charge 
and long-term tenancy charge), the tenant determined that the 
landlord would have been required to spend $40,360 in improve-
ments to the small, non-luxurious apartment in order to justify 
the increase in rent. When the tenant priced all the appliances 
and fixtures in both the kitchen and the bathroom, he determined 
that the amount that the landlord could have realistically spent 
on both parts and labor was far below $40,360, and that both 
the rent and the deregulation of the apartment was likely to be 
based on fraud. The tenant filed a rent overcharge complaint 
with the DHCR in 2008, and is awaiting adjudication. 
• Case study 6: A tenant moved into a apartment in Washing-
ton Heights, Manhattan, in 2004. Her lease stated that the legal 
rent for the apartment registered with the DHCR was $2,539, 
although the tenant was asked to pay a lower “preferential” rent 
of $1,400 that was more in-line with the actual market value of 
the apartment. The tenant became suspicious that the rent may 
not have been legally set, and discovered that the tenant prior 
to her paid only $992 a month. When the apartment became 
Data obtained from the DHCR shows 
that overcharge 
complaints to that 
agency have risen 
37% in the last 18 
months, and that 
may suggest that 
there is a growing 
problem, and that 
these few rent over-
charge complaints 
are the small tip of 
a large iceberg. 
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vacant, the landlord would have been automatically allowed to 
raise the rent to $1,249. But to justify the additional $1,290 to 
get to the registered rent, the landlord would have had to have 
spent $51,600 in 1/40th improvements. Upon investigation, 
the tenant discovered that the landlord may have modernized 
the kitchen appliances and bathroom fixtures, but pricing out 
the work, it should have cost far less then the $51,600 claimed 
by the landlord. The tenant has filed an overcharge complaint 
with the DHCR and is waiting a response. 
• Case study 7: A tenant in upper Manhattan moved into 
an apartment in 2002, paying a monthly rent of $1,504. Upon 
examination of rent documents, the tenant discovered that part 
of the rent was based on $12,000 in 1/40th improvements for 
work that it was clear to the tenant had never been performed. 
The tenant filed an overcharge complaint with the DHCR al-
leging 1/40th fraud. In 2008, the DHCR found an illegal over-
charge and issued an order in the tenant favor. 
• Case study 8: A tenant in a rent-stabilized building on 
Manhattan’s West Side investigated why the lease she was 
given stated that her apartment was not rent stabilized. After 
inquiring with the DHCR, she discovered that her apartment 
may have been fraudulently removed from rent stabilization 
because the registered rent had doubled from what the previ-
ous tenant had paid.  
Factoring in the vacancy increase for a new lease and the in-
crease for a one or two year lease, the landlord would have 
had to have spent $60,000 improving her apartment in order 
to legally bring the rent up to what he was charging. It was 
apparent, however, that very little work had been done on the 
apartment. The tenant filed an overcharge complaint with the 
DHCR and is waiting a response. 
A CCORDING to an analysis byANHD, there has been   
an “unnatural” decrease   
in moderate-rent   
apartments. 
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Contrasting the Major Capital 
Improvement Rent Increase Program: 
The lax oversight mechanism of the 1/40th program stands in 
sharp contrast with the Major Capital Improvement (MCI) rent 
increase program. The 1/40th program is designed to allow a 
rent increase for an individual apartment because of physical 
improvements to that apartment. The MCI program is designed 
to allow across-the-board rent increases in a building because 
of improvements in major, building-wide systems such as a new 
roof, new boiler, or new windows for the entire building. The 
oversight structures of the programs are very different. 
Before a landlord can collect an MCI rent increase, the landlord 
must first submit proof of expenses to the DHCR for review. The 
DHCR then informs the tenants in writing that the landlord has 
filed for an MCI, and invites them provide further information to 
the DHCR, which the DHCR takes into account when the agen-
cy approves or rejects the MCI increase application.  There are 
clear standards to the MCI program, and the DHCR oversees 
and upholds those standards. 
Landlord compliance with the rules of the MCI program com-
pare favorably to compliance with the rules of the 1/40th loop-
hole. This is a result of the proactive role that the DHCR plays 
in administering MCIs, along with the proactive notice provided 
to tenants. 
THE PROBLEM of fraudulent 1/40th increases is made 
worse by the pressure to 
increase rent that comes 
from the phenomena 
known as “predatory 
equity”. 
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Estimating the Scale of the 
1/40th Fraud Problem:
Because the core of the problem is that there is no effective 
oversight of the 1/40th program, it is difficult to find official sta-
tistics that indicate the scale of the problem. Data obtained from 
the DHCR shows that overcharge complaints to that agency 
have risen 37% in the last 18 months, and that may suggest that 
there is a growing problem, and that these few rent overcharge 
complaints are the small tip of a large iceberg. 
There is no accurate government record of the frequency with 
which 1/40th increases are used because there is no oversight 
of the program. However, it is clear that rent regulated apart-
ments are moving out of affordability at a rate faster then statu-
tory rent increases would allow. 
According to an analysis by ANHD, there has been an “unnatu-
ral” decrease in moderate-rent apartments: There was a 20 per-
cent decrease in the number of units renting for less than $1000 
between 2002 and 2005 according to the NYC Housing Vacancy 
Survey.
•9 percent of these apartments should have migrated out of the 
less then $1,000 category due to the annual rent increases al-
lowed by the New York Rent Guidelines Board.
• The other 11 percent—164,013 apartments—is an “unnatural” 
movement that cannot be explained by market forces alone and 
is likely a result of other factors, including harassment. 
There has also been a sharp decrease in the number of rent-reg-
ulated apartments: Between 2002 and 2005, the NYC Housing 
Vacancy Survey reported that 44,000 apartments were removed 
from rent regulation using various legal loopholes.  This num-
ber has accelerated dramatically every year, with almost 14,000 
rent stabilized units lost in 2006 alone. The accelerating rate of 
the loss of rent-regulated units coincides with an increased use 
by landlords of High Rent Vacancy Decontrol. Passed in 1997, 
but only widely used in recent years, High Rent Vacancy Decon-
trol allows landlords to permanently remove a vacant apartment 
from rent regulation if it has a legal regulated rent of $2,000 or 
more per month. 
THE CURRENT program formula and complaint 
-driven system of   
oversight is inadequate.
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1/40th Fraud and Predatory Equity:
The problem of fraudulent 1/40th increases is made worse by the pressure to 
increase rent that comes from the phenomena known as “predatory equity”. 
In recent years, neighborhoods around New York City have seen a dramatic 
rise in the harassment of tenants as landlords try to illegally remove working 
families so they can raise the rent using the 1/40th mechanism. There is a 
direct connection between this increase in harassment and the rise of a new 
type of buyer of New York City real estate. These new buyers are private 
equity-backed investors who are raising money from Wall Street-type funds 
that create a pressure for profit levels that, in rent regulated buildings, can 
only be achieved by illegally displacing tenants and undermining affordable 
rents. Many of the lending institutions that are providing the huge loans for 
the purchase of these buildings are pooling and re-selling the loans in mort-
gage-backed securities. 
Private equity-backed developers have, in the past four years, purchased 
an estimated 90,000 units of affordable, rent regulated housing. This is a 
significant percentage – almost 10% - of our rent-regulated housing and rep-
resents a major threat to affordable housing and stable communities. This 
“predatory equity”, is undermining the best attempts of New York City and 
State elected officials to slow the loss of affordable housing. 
The growth in rental income from a well-managed rent-regulated building 
can be expected to rise in a steady, but moderate line. Under rent regulation, 
leases must be renewed and rents can only be increased by a moderate 
amount (as set by a city Rent Guidelines Board) with each lease renewal. 
Although dramatic increases in rent can be taken on vacant apartments, the 
“natural” turnover rate for tenants in rent regulated apartments averages be-
tween 5% -10%, which does not translate to the huge jump in rental income 
that speculative purchasers need to satisfy their debt obligations.
The premise of an illegally high tenant turnover is made clear in loan under-
writing documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
for a group of buildings in Washington Heights owned by Vantage Proper-
ties, which state that Vantage “anticipates to recapture approximately 20-
30% of the units [within the first year], and 10% a year thereafter” in order to 
pay the debt service on their loan. However, these targets seem unjustifiable 
since only 1% of the apartments in these buildings were vacant at the time 
the loan was made, according to the SEC documents, and the annual rate 
of turnover for rent-regulated buildings is only 5.6%, according to the Rent 
Guidelines Board.  The reason that high tenant turnover is an explicit goal of 
these predatory equity landlords is that sudden and dramatic rent increases 
be taken on vacant apartments through the use of the 1/40th program. 
The planned use of 1/40th increases is specified in the same SEC underwrit-
ing documents. A typical plan filed with the SEC states, “The sponsors plan 
to improve the [building] portfolio’s performance by making capital improve-
ments to individual units and raising rents to market levels…The sponsors 
are permitted to increase rents by approximately 17-20% on rent stabilized 
units each time a unit is vacated. In addition, the sponsor’s (sic) are permit-
ted to increase the monthly rent of stabilized units by 1/40th of the amount 
spent on renovations of such units. The sponsor’s current plans calls for 
renovations to individual units…which would, on average, bring the vacated 
units to market level rent.”
“PReDatoRy   equity” is                   
the best            
attempts of 
New york City 
and State 
elected officials 
to slow the loss 
of affordable 
housing. 
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undermining
Solutions:
Any program as lucrative as the 1/40th program, but where there is no oversight and no enforcement, 
will inevitably invite fraud and abuse. The current program formula and complaint-driven system of 
oversight is inadequate. The state statute must be changed to tighten the loophole and extend the 
amortization period. The DHCR must accept a more active role in the 1/40th loophole in order to 
fulfill the agency mandate that it enforce the rules of the rent regulation system and prevent the loss 
of affordable housing due to fraud. Tenants and community advocates are proposing five solutions.
Solutions that require state legislative change:
1.  extend the amortization period of the program:
 
• The state statute should be changed to extending the amortization formula from 40 months to 84 
months, mirroring the MCI statute. 
2.  tighten oversight of the program:
• The state statute should be changed to specifically allow the DHCR to require proof of expenses 
and prior approval for rent increases under the loophole, mirroring the MCI statute. 
Solutions the state housing agency can implement immediately: 
3.  strengthen oversight through dhCr audits: 
• In order to deter landlords from filing fraudulent 1/40th increases, DHCR should audit 30% of the 
vacancy increase filings on an annual basis.
• When a landlord is found by the DHCR to have used a 1/40th increase as the basis for an illegal 
overcharge, the DHCR should audit all recent 1/40th rent increases imposed by that landlord. 
4.  strengthen oversight by evaluating proof of expenses: 
• Where the landlord reports an increase in the rent of a vacant apartment of 25% or more (on top 
of the 20% vacancy increase that is automatically allowed by the guidelines), and that increase is 
based in part on an asserted 1/40th increase, the DHCR should retroactively review proof of the 
cost of the improvement to determine if the expenses already claimed are legitimate. 
5.  strengthen oversight through additional notifiCation to tenants: 
•Where the landlord reports an increase in the rent of a vacant apartment of 25% or more based 
on an asserted 1/40th increase, the DHCR should send written notification to the tenant, along 
with a copy of the apartment rent history, informing them of the landlord’s 1/40th claim and advis-
ing the tenant of their right to file a Complaint of Rent Overcharge if they believe that the claimed 
1/40th cost do not reflect the actual work done. 
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the dhCr’s Current legal authority:
The steps outlined above can be taken by the DHCR without 
any change to the law. The DHCR has the power to issue or-
ders on its own initiative determining the legal regulated rent for 
an apartment when the legal rent is “in doubt or is not known.” 
RSC § 2522.6(a).   DHCR may “institute a proceeding on its own 
initiative whenver the DHCR deems it necessary or appropriate 
pursuant to the RSL.”  RSC § 2527.2.  DHCR may “administer 
oaths, issue subpoenas, conduct investigations, make inspec-
tions and designate officers to hear and report.”  RSC § 2526.4. 
DHCR may require owners to “furnish information under oath or 
affirmation … permit inspection and copying of records and other 
documents, and permit inspection of any housing accommoda-
tions.”  RSC § 2526.6(a). Owners may be required to “make and 
keep records and other documents and make reports.”  RSC § 
2526.6(b).  These RSC provisions are authorized under Sec-
tions 26-516(b) and (f) of the RSL.  
Under this authority, DHCR may investigate patterns of conduct 
calculated to subvert the RSL or to prevent profiteering, spec-
ulation and other disruptive practices.  RSL § 26-501; RSC § 
2520.3.   DHCR’s authority should extend to investigations of 
the legality of vacancy increases that exceed the statutory 20 
percent allowance.  McGoey v. Holland, 237 A.D.2d 523 (2nd 
Dep’t 1997) (DHCR revokes increase after investigation shows 
MCIs were fraudulent); Clermont York Associates v. Lynch, 271 
A.D.2d 262, (1st Dep’t 2000) (collapse of façade warrants revo-
cation of MCI increase); Mauro v. DHCR, 250 A.D.2d 392 (1st 
Dep’t 1998) (combination of investigatory, prosecutory and qua-
si-judicial functions in a single administrative agency is not in 
itself violative of due process).
ANY PROGRAM as lucrative as the 1/40th    
program, but where 
there is no oversight 
and no enforcement, 
will inevitably invite   
fraud and abuse.
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